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ABSTRACT 
Mergers in Emerging Markets with Network Externalities: The Case of Telecoms 
by Mathias Dewatripont and Patrick Legros 
This paper develops a unifying framework to understand competition issues in network 
industries. It focuses on the telecom(munication) industry and takes two specific effects 
of  this industry into account. First, the telecom industry is in continuous evolution and 
alliances affect not only the current market power of the firms but also the evolution of 
the industry. Second, the production of services in the industry is evolving towards the 
provision of integrated services in a “system” that benefits from strong “network 
externalities”. The analysis suggests that the antitrust authorities should capture as well 
such effects as the magnitude of the installed bases, the compatibility of the alliance’s 
system with other systems, the switching costs for customers and application writers, 
and the “credibility” of the alliance to offer the service. The developed framework 
builds on the existing models of networks and combines the different network effects. 
The relevance of the framework is shown for two important merger cases (WorldCom-
MCI and MSG cases), involving respectively an existing market and an emerging one.  
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG   
Unternehmenszusammenschlüsse in entstehenden Märkten mit Netzexternalitäten: 
Das Beispiel der Telekommunikationsindustrie 
In diesem Beitrag wird ein einheitlicher Bezugsrahmen zur Analyse des Wettbewerbs in 
Netzwerkindustrien entwickelt. Er zielt auf die Analyse der Telekommunikations-
industrie ab und berücksichtigt dabei spezielle Effekte dieser Industrie. Erstens ist die 
Telekommunikationsindustrie durch eine stetige Evolution gekennzeichnet und 
Allianzen zwischen den Unternehmen beeinflussen nicht nur die aktuelle Marktmacht 
der Unternehmen, sondern auch die Entwicklung der Industrie. Zweitens entwickelt sich 
die Produktion der Dienste in dieser Industrie immer stärker in Richtung auf das Ange-
bot integrierter Dienste (Systemangebote), die Vorteile aus Netzexternalitäten nutzen. 
Die Analyse zeigt auch, daß die Wettbewerbsbehörden ebenfalls Merkmale wie die An-
zahl der verfügbaren Anschlüsse, die Kompatibilität des Systems der Allianz mit 
anderen Systemen, die Wechselkosten der Kunden sowie die Glaubwürdigkeit der 
Dienstleistungsqualität der Allianz berücksichtigen sollten. Der entwickelte Bezugs-
rahmen stützt sich auf die vorhandenen Netzmodelle und kombiniert die unterschied-
lichen Netzeffekte und -merkmale. Die Bedeutung des Ansatzes wird am Beispiel von 
zwei wichtigen Fusionsfällen aufgezeigt (WorldCom-MCI und MSG), bei denen es sich 
jeweils um einen existierenden und einen entstehenden Markt handelt.  
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Introduction 
The recent series of alliances in the telecommunication industry is a challenge to 
antitrust authorities. In addition to the usual challenge of defining market power, 
specific aspects of the industry make the task of evaluating the effects of alliances or of 
full mergers difficult:  
1. The telecommunication industry is in continuous evolution and alliances affect not 
only the current market power of the firms but also the evolution of the industry. 
2. The production of services in the industry is becoming similar to what has been 
witnessed in the computer industry, with an evolution towards the provision of 
integrated services in a “system” that benefits from strong “network externalities” 
(that is, virtuous circles by which consumers value a good more the higher the 
number of other customers served by the firm). 
In this paper, we suggest a framework to take into account both effects and to 
evaluate the costs and benefits of alliances. We develop a framework that builds on the 
existing models of networks and that combines different network effects that have been 
identified separately in the literature. This is an important task in our view given the 
increasing importance of industries with network externalities in the economy, their 
crucial role in aggregate technological progress and their high potential for 
monopolization. 
In emerging market industries, the market power analysis must be by definition 
prospective; the current market power of firms is only an imperfect indicator of their 
future market power. Authorizing certain alliances can have an effect not only on the 
future concentration in the industry but also on the standards that will become dominant. 
In order to evaluate the distortions that can be introduced by alliances (with respect to 
the status-quo situation), our analysis suggests that the antitrust authorities should 
capture such effects as: 
♦ The magnitude of the installed bases, 
♦ The compatibility of the alliance’s system with other systems, 
♦ The switching costs for customers and application writers, 
♦ The “credibility” of the alliance to offer the service. 
We argue that a number of the effects we have identified here are implicit in the 
concerns that have led the European Commission to impose conditions on the 
WorldCom-MCI merger proposal and to block the MSG Media Services joint venture 
proposal (in the first case, the concern was the degradation of compatibility between 
Internet backbones by a dominant WorldCom-MCI, and in the second case the 
monopolization of the emerging digital pay-TV market in Germany). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 1, we present a 
unified framework for markets that present network effects, pointing for each type of 
market how network effects play and how dominance can be achieved. In Section 2 we 
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develop the connection with the WorldCom-MCI and MSG cases in terms of the 
typology introduced in Section 1. In Section 3, we conclude.  
1. Network Markets and Network Effects 
1.1. Typology of Network Markets 
1.1.1. Communication Markets, Systems Markets and Mixed Markets 
The most obvious benefit of subscribing to a telecom operator is the ability to 
call other people on the network. Intuitively, the more agents subscribe to the network, 
the larger is the benefit for an individual agent (as long as the agent cares to 
communicate with the other agents on the network). Markets where the benefit of 
consumers comes from the ability to communicate with other consumers via the 
network can be called communication markets. A large literature that we briefly review 
below has developed in order to understand the dynamics of such markets, especially the 
snowball effects that are related to the increasing benefit that consumers obtain when 
the number of subscribers to their network increases (based on the classic papers Katz 
and Shapiro 1985, Farrell and Saloner 1985). In short, the “network effect” in 
communication markets is the fact that the more agents are present on a network, the 
greater are the incentives for other agents to join this network. 
Recently, a literature has considered products that are obtained by combining 
different components in a complementary way (see for instance the survey by Katz and 
Shapiro 1994 and the papers by Church and Gandal 1992, Gilbert 1992, Chou and Shy 
1990, Farrell and Saloner 1992, Matutes and Regibeau 1988). Obvious examples are the 
complementarity between computer and software applications, between VCRs and 
tapes, or between game consoles like Nintendo and games. We follow Katz and Shapiro 
(1994) in calling these markets systems markets. In systems markets, the “network 
effect” is the fact that the more applications are available for a system, the greater are 
the incentives for consumers to purchase the system, and the more application writers 
desire writing applications for this system. Crucial for these markets is the degree of 
compatibility between different systems. For instance many VCRs can now read tapes 
that have been recorded under different formats (Pal, Secam for Europe, NTSC for the 
U.S.) but VCRs that also record from any format into any format are quite expensive 
(typically four times the price of a regular multi-system VCR).  
Finally, we call markets that combine both communication and systems market 
features mixed markets. Hence, customers on these markets benefit not only from 
linkage to other agents but also from access to the complementary services provided on 
the network. For instance, a subscriber to AOL has two types of benefits: (1) 
“Communication benefits”: the ability to send e-mail messages to friends, family, or 
colleagues or to meet previously unknown other customers of AOL (in what is called 
“chat rooms”, where customers exchange—in real time—ideas, or “game rooms”, where 
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customers play—in real time—games). (2) “Services”: for instance, access to services 
that are provided by other sources (web pages for instance) or that are proprietary to the 
AOL network (for instance information on weather, on financial market performances, 
or proprietary “virtual shows”). Note that in (2) the benefits increase with the number of 
services that can be provided, i.e., in the form of links to other providers or sources of 
information (like the public Internet) and to proprietary services of AOL.  
In systems and in mixed markets, there is therefore an “up” market (services) 
and a “down” market (customers) and the sizes of the “up” and of the “down” markets 
affect the benefits of the customers in the “down” market. Moreover, the size of the 
“down” market will determine the incentives for service providers in the “up” market to 
join a given system.  
1.1.2. A Unified Framework  
Having defined a typology of markets that will exhibit network effects, we can 
now understand the common structure of these different markets, and later the 
conditions that will generate dominance. 
We first offer a unifying view of these markets, based on a three-layer structure 
representing the product that customers effectively purchase.1 We give the layers the 
generic names of hardware, interface and applications. In markets that are relevant for 
our analysis, there is an interface – which is in general based on software but could be a 
mechanical device – that enables the functioning of the network or provision of services 
(via the use of applications) to the customer. 
                                                 
1  As should be clear, the three-layer structure is for simplification.  
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Product Hardware Interface Applications 
Communication markets 
Simple 
telephony 
Telephone lines Switches (manual or 
computerized) 
Not very relevant 
Systems markets 
Personal 
computers 
Box and microchip, 
disk drives, … 
Operating system (windows, 
Unix, OS2) 
Word processing, 
relational database 
programs,… 
VCR Box, motor for tape, 
etc. 
Software that translates the 
signals from the tape and 
that commands the motor 
speed, … 
Recorded feature films, 
cartoons, … 
Mixed markets 
Public 
Internet 
PSTN (Public 
Switched Telephone 
Network), fiber optic 
networks 
Core backbones and routing 
processes, internet protocol 
Messaging, Web 
pages,… 
Global 
Communicat
ions 
Transport networks 
(theirs and other 
carriers) 
Internet Protocol Platform, 
Application Provider 
Interfaces 
Video conferencing,  e-
commerce, Global call 
centers, Messaging… 
Table 1 
1.2. Dominance in Network Markets: Theory 
How is dominance achieved and preserved in markets with network 
externalities? Beyond the classical way of dominance by merger, such markets are 
prone, as the literature has clearly established since the mid-80s (e.g., Katz and Shapiro 
1994), to significant tendencies for monopolization through “positive feedback effects” 
or snowball effects. 
It will be useful to go back to our typology of markets in order to understand 
how these snowball effects are generated in communication markets, systems markets 
and mixed markets. 
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1.2.1. Snowball Effects in Communication Markets 
Consider a market in which new customers enter each period and can decide to 
join one of many competing firms. Consider the decision of an individual customer who 
has to choose between different networks at a given point in time. As we know now, the 
main network effect comes from the ability to communicate with other customers (now 
and in the future).  
To communicate now, two factors are important: first the ability to communicate 
on-net (i.e., inside the network that is chosen) and the ability to communicate off-net 
(i.e., with customers of other networks). The ability to communicate on-net is related to 
the number of current customers of the network, what is called  the installed base of 
consumers. The ability to communicate off-net is related to the compatibility between 
the networks. In terms of table 1, while most telecoms use the same “hardware”, they 
have different “interfaces” (provisioning systems and interconnections with other 
networks).  If the networks are fully compatible, the quality of communication off-net is 
similar to the quality of communication on-net and the relative sizes of the installed 
bases do not translate into competitive advantages. If however the networks are not 
compatible at all, then the network with the largest installed base offers the greatest 
benefits to consumers and this can translate into a competitive advantage.  
To communicate in the future, consumers must form expectations about their 
future ability to communicate (on-net or off-net). In particular, they must form 
expectations about the ability of the network operators to continue their service, about 
the future base of consumers on different networks and the future quality of 
communication on-net and off-net. The greater are the expectations of a consumer about 
the future quality of a given network, the greater are his expected benefits from joining 
this network. Positive expectations of the consumers about the quality of a network can 
therefore translate into a competitive advantage. 
The decision to join a given network depends on both the installed base and the 
expectations of the consumers (about compatibility, quality, consumers). Snowball 
effects refer to the phenomenon by which a large installed base creates positive 
expectations about the future size of the network in a self-reinforcing way since 
consumers have incentives to join the network now and therefore increase the installed 
base tomorrow. 
As we have seen, the key ingredients for snowballing to yield dominance and 
positive profits are: a strong installed base, positive switching costs (but not necessarily 
high), some degree of incompatibility (which can be endogenous) with competing 
networks, and credibility of the continuing existence of the network (which is partly 
endogenous since the profitability of the network is related to its number of consumers). 
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1.2.2. Snowball Effects in Systems Markets 
In systems markets, the network effect is indirect since it relates the benefits of 
consumers to the availability of the applications. We could apply almost immediately 
the reasoning of the previous section and point to the same factors for explaining the 
acquisition and the persistence of dominance in systems markets. This would however 
hide important differences between the two environments, the least of which is that a 
firm introducing a system has to get dominance on two markets: the “up” market 
(applications) and the “down” market (consumers). 
Installed base: Attracting consumers will depend on the current and future 
availability of applications. Attracting application writers will depend on the expected 
profits that they can obtain by joining the system, profits that in turn depend on the 
number of consumers present in the market. Hence, both the installed base of consumers 
(on the “down” market) and the installed base of applications (on the “up” market) are 
important to generate snowball effects. Because the snowball effect on both ends of the 
market reinforce each other, it seems that systems markets will be more prone to create 
dominance (tipping) via network effects than communication markets. 
Switching costs: Switching costs must be positive for both consumers and 
application writers. These switching costs are related to the degree of compatibility 
between systems; for instance if Windows applications can run—and provide the same 
quality—on Apple based machines, the switch would not involve the repurchase of 
applications. As for communication markets, switching costs need not be “high.” If 
going from a system to the next the set of applications available to use on the system 
decreases in a significant way, then there is an “indirect” switching cost equal to the 
difference of benefits obtained by consuming two products H-I-A with unequal A. Here 
again, this effect is likely to be important when the two systems H-I are not compatible.  
Compatibility: If systems (that include APIs) are compatible, e.g., if they utilize 
a common industry standard, applications developed for one system can easily be 
“ported” onto another system (Besen and Farrell 1994, Farrell and Saloner 1992). If 
systems are not compatible however, then dominance in installed bases can translate 
into further dominance by the snowball effects. In particular, a firm’s strategy will 
typically encourage a generous supply of applications, while also trying to discourage 
the supply of applications to rivals (Besen and Farrell 1994) It can be shown that this 
strategy is most likely to succeed when a firm has an initial advantage in installed bases 
because it can credibly compete away application developers from rival systems. 
Credibility of the product: since the system H-I and the applications A define the 
product, the credibility of the product depends on the present and future availability of  
the system (H-I) and of the applications (A). It also depends on the reputation of the 
firm introducing the system. Firms with well established brand names have more to lose 
from failing than firms which are less known, hence they will either avoid introducing a 
system that is not ready or they will try – like IBM did for the PCjr – very hard not to 
have the product fail by supporting application developers for instance.  
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1.2.3. Snowball Effects in Mixed Markets 
Mixed markets combine and compound the network effects of communication 
markets and systems markets. The two effects—the direct effect due to communication 
and the indirect due to the services provided by applications—are operating in the same 
direction. Consumers have direct switching costs that are for instance the need to buy a 
new system, to learn how to use the new system and the new applications. Consumers 
have also indirect switching costs that are related to the loss in communication benefits 
and to the loss in services. Application writers have also direct and indirect switching 
costs: the direct costs are linked to the writing of applications for a different system or to 
convert their initial application into the standard of the new system (on the strategic use 
of converters, see for instance Farrell and Saloner 1992); the indirect costs are linked to 
the loss of revenues that can be obtained due to the difference in the consumers bases.2  
Hence network effects will be at least as large as in the other markets and intuition 
would suggest that the network effects are in fact stronger in mixed markets. 
2. The WorldCom-MCI and MSG Cases 
In the previous section we stressed the importance of direct and indirect network 
effects that will benefit an alliance and the analysis that demonstrates their likely impact 
in terms of durable dominance of an emerging market. We now turn more precisely to 
two leading cases in European competition policy which are very instructive on these 
issues, namely, WorldCom-MCI and MSG Media Services. 
To organize the analysis, Table 2 presents the three cases in terms of the unified 
framework of Section 1. For WorldCom-MCI, a proposed merger of two telecom 
companies with substantial Internet businesses, the relevance of the framework is 
straightforward since Table 1 already considered public Internet (we focus on this aspect 
of that merger since divestiture of MCI’s Internet business was a condition for the 
merger to be cleared). Let us stress that the dominance of the core backbones was the 
key deciding issue in the case. Indeed, the TCP/IP protocol was a standard publicly 
available for applications, so that dominance on backbone interconnection was the only 
concern. 
MSG Media Services was a proposed venture between Bertelsmann (a leading 
German media group), Kirch (the leading German supplier of feature films and 
television programming) and Deutsche Telekom (then the monopoly provider of 
telephone service in Germany and the owner/operator of nearly all German broadband 
cable networks). The venture intended to be the first to offer digital Pay-TV in 
Germany. Just like in our unified framework, we can distinguish three layers that are 
                                                 
2  This also implies that the application writer has less incentives to improve his application on a 
system that yields lower revenues.  
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complementary for providing the final product. And just like in our framework, 
dominance on the emerging market of digital Pay-TV comes from monopolization of at 
least one layer. 
Case Hardware Interface Applications 
WorldCom-MCI PSTN, fiber 
optic 
networks 
Core backbones and 
routing processes, 
internet protocol 
Messaging, Web 
pages,… 
MSG Media 
Services 
Cable 
network 
Decoders and access 
system software 
Feature films, shows, 
cartoons, … 
    
Table 2 
2.1  WorldCom-MCI  
In the WorldCom-MCI merger proposal, it can be argued (Crémer, Rey and 
Tirole 1998) that, with a sizable post-merger market share on the Internet backbone 
segment, a significant risk of further dominance was present through degradation of the 
quality of interconnection of Internet backbones. This risk was due in that case to a lack 
of incentives for improvement or maintenance of this quality by WorldCom-MCI. The 
argument can be summarized as follows:  
• First, the quality of interconnection between two backbones depends on investments 
by both backbone owners to maintain/improve this quality; it is thus the party that 
invests less that determines the quality of interconnection. 
• Second, when considering a specific pair of backbones, the net gain from such 
investment in interconnection quality is much lower when one’s backbone has a 
much larger market share than the other backbone, since the customer of the smaller 
backbone will want to use this interconnection for a much bigger proportion of use 
than the customer of the larger backbone. In fact, poorer quality of interconnection 
between this pair of backbones can even induce the customer of the larger backbone 
to try and stay “on-net”. 
• Poor interconnection can thus trigger a snowball effect with ever increasing market 
share for the large backbone and thus full domination in a pretty short time horizon. 
Such a snowball effect can be accelerated by various strategies pursued by the 
dominant firm: first by a “divide-and-conquer strategy,” by which the dominant firm 
degrades the quality of interconnection with one competitor at a time, until the 
implied nuisance leads its customers to leave its backbone; second by charging 
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smaller networks high interconnection fees, or by pricing on-net traffic at 
advantageous rates relative to off-net traffic for its own customers. 
• In the absence of the merger between WorldCom and MCI, there were a number of 
players in the Internet backbone market with reasonably symmetric market shares. 
They consequently had reasonably symmetric incentives to all invest in maintaining 
good-quality interconnection between themselves and thus to contribute to an ever 
improving “cooperative standard”. Instead, a merger without divestiture of its 
Internet business by either WorldCom or MCI would have created this asymmetric 
situation by which, through lack of investment in the quality of interconnection by 
this dominant firm, “de facto standardization by monopolization” would have 
occurred, with the subsequent dangers for consumers of Internet backbone services.  
Concerns of this sort have led the European Commission to insist on divestiture 
by WorldCom of its Internet business as a precondition for allowing the merger to go 
through. 
2.2  MSG  
The leading case to date concerning emerging telecom markets and its related 
risk of dominance is MSG Media Services (Commission 1994). In paragraph 55 of the 
Commission decision, it is stated: 
“Although a monopoly in a future market that is only just beginning to develop 
should not necessarily be regarded as a dominant position within the meaning of Article 
2(3) of the Merger Regulation, the assumption that no market dominance exists 
presupposes in such a case that the future market in question remains open to future 
competition and that the monopoly is consequently only temporary”. 
In the MSG Media Services case, the Commission ruled (in paragraphs 61-63) 
that the monopoly position of the venture would not have been temporary, in particular 
because of: 
• all potential competing pay-TV providers’ dependence on Deutsche Telekom’s cable 
network; 
• the parties’ substantial existing customer bases (in cable network and analog pay-TV) 
and distribution bases (store-front network for DT, book clubs for Bertelsmann); 
• the parties’ complementary strengths, in technology for DT and programming for 
Bertelsmann and Kirch. 
This has led the European Commission to block the proposed venture altogether. 
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3. Conclusion 
In this short paper, we have presented a unifying framework to understand 
competition issues in network industries. Such industries are by nature prone to 
monopolization, and are thus a big concern for antitrust authorities. We have focused on 
the telecom industry here, given its importance in the aggregate economy and given its 
high level of activity in terms of mergers and joint ventures. We have shown the 
relevance of the framework for two important merger cases, involving respectively an 
existing market and an emerging one. We feel that many more cases are to come, and 
that refining the analysis in their light will be an important task. 
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